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understanding that photographs must be approached visually. They take it as a given that 
photographs are pictures to be looked at, and they all agree that it is only through looking that 
photographs communicate. Whatever subsequent interpretations follow, the priority of vision 
in relation to the image remains unperturbed. This belief in the visibility of the photograph 
imperceptibly bonded together otherwise dissimilar and sometimes contradictory 
methodologies, preventing them from noticing that which is the most unexplained about 
photography: the precedence of looking itself. This self-evident truth of visibility blocks the 
possibility of inquiring after everything that is non-visual in a picture. However, the digital 
image forces a reevaluation of visibility because it clear that the visible cannot account for 
images that begin their life as binary data, developed algorithmically and driven to various 
points across the network not as individual pictures but as packets of data. Through a reading 
of Heidegger, Deleuze and Benjamin this paper suggests that digital-born photography cannot 
be explained away in representational terms; rather it calls for a theory that can account for 
proliferation and self-replication as the purveyors of meaning online.   
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1. Where is the latent image
The latent image occurs when photographic film is exposed to light and the action of 
the charged light particles on the silver halide grains forms sites of metallic silver. The 
changes to the film as a result of the exposure are on a molecular level and require subsequent 
chemical development in order to become visible to the eye. From the moment of exposure 
and up to the ensuing chemical development the latent image has to be kept in light-tight film 
canisters or dark-slides until it is ready to be developed. Developing the film destroys the 
latent image since it converts silver halide crystals to metallic silver grains and produces the 
film negative. Given the fundamental importance of the latent image to the process of making 
a photograph, it is thought provoking that it is habitually omitted from the orthodoxy of 
photographic criticism and theory. While the latent image has very specific meaning in 
photographic chemistry and physics as the invisible image left on the light sensitive surface 
by exposure, histories and theories of photography rarely devote more than a passing 
reference to it, and while its importance to the photographic process is usually acknowledged 
on a technical level, photographic criticism has nothing to say about it, making it doubly 
invisible. Michel Frizot’s monumental New History of Photography states that that latent 
image ‘remains fundamental to the photographic process’ yet it addresses it in a single 
paragraph.  (Frizot 1998, 61) Thus, the latent image is both ‘fundamental’ and there is 
nothing to say about it. It is the invisible image that has been forgotten. The reluctance of 
theory to talk about this primordial state can be considered symptomatic of the desire to focus 
on the visible and tangible object-image and ignore the invisible without questioning the basic 
premise of the distinction itself.  
However, the transition towards electronically produced and algorithmically 
computed images suggests that the non-visual aspects of images are at least as important to 
meaning creation as visual qualities. It will be a mistake to approach such an image as an 
abstraction, as a representation of external reality or as a painting with light because there is 
always a multiplicity of forces at play that place the image in a range of contexts, 
assemblages and situations. The hyper-growth in various forms of digital imagery for screens 
provides a quintessential example of this multiplicity at work. The triumph of the 
photographic image as the internally eloquent and profoundly apt expression of networked 
culture also provides a new lens upon which to investigate how representation affects norms 
of meaning-creation, and the ethical and political consequences of the acceptance of images 
as purveyors of truth. For instance, the emphasis placed on the visual content of images tends 
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to obscure the processes of dissemination, production and dispersion that contain their own 
intelligent messages, quite apart from the semantic content that clings to the surface of the 
image. Indeed, the proliferation of various forms of automatically produced, read and 
distributed images disrupts the familiar understanding of the photograph as a verisimilitude 
that provides reliable representation of reality.  
2. The spectre of representation
There never was a ‘clean break’ with the analogue past. The digital image is based in 
part at least on old technologies and old means of production. For instance, the lens at the 
front of a digital camera is exactly the same piece of glass that graced film cameras before the 
invention of digital photography (some digital cameras are even designed to accept those old 
manual lenses). In addition, the digital image is often said to resemble an analogue 
photograph: comparisons of grain to pixels abound to prove that the digital image can capture 
just as much detail – if not more – than the film photograph. However, drawing these 
parallels between digital and analogue processes risks missing the paradigmatic shift of 
digitality, which both overcomes and transfigures the limits of representation. If the image on 
the computer screen seems to resemble the look of a traditional photograph this is mostly due 
to the work of computational processes designed to make these data packages look familiar 
and homey. Modern digital cameras offer the ability to recreate the aesthetics of photographic 
films: with a push of a button one’s snaps can look like they were shoot on Velvia© or 
Provia©. But imitation does not stop there: the totality of the digital image is in fact a 
skeuomorph – its adherence to the visual conventions of photography is simply an ornamental 
decision taken by the creators of the processing algorithms, as the data captured by the 
camera sensor could be just as easily output as something completely different: a string of 
alphanumeric characters, a sound or even remain unprocessed as binary data.  (Rubinstein and 
Sluis 2013b, 22-40)  
Even the notion that the digital image is a self-contained entity is misleading: one of 
the characteristics of the digital age is that all images are potentially linked through 
communication networks which distribute, mediate, assemble and re-assemble electronic 
signals that might or might not appear as a picture at some point of a perpetual cycle of 
packaging and re-processing of data. As all the images are drawn from the same infinite 
torrent of networked files, to some extent it is possible to speculate that there only ever was 
and only ever will be one networked image. The representational model that sees each picture 
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as an autonomous entity linked with an event in the real world falls apart in the face of the 
perpetual circulation of data that only occasionally appears as images. If taken seriously, 
these considerations suggest that the essence of the photographic image online has little to do 
with the semiotics of representation, economy of signs, signifiers and indices, rather the truth 
of the image has to be found in its inherent incompleteness and the constant bifurcation into 
divergent but interconnected narratives. Therefore the digital image consists not in reflecting 
external reality but in showing the extent to which reality itself is inseparable from the 
computational processes that shape it. Thus the arrival of the digital image is first and 
foremost overwhelming; images do not appear as singular, individual or discrete; they do not 
have borders that separate one image from another, rather data is distributed according to 
certain rules, sending some of it to the screen as an image, some of it to the speakers as 
sounds and some of it to the printer as text. These ‘images’ traverse the networks not as 
snapshots but as dynamic arrays of electronic signals and packets of data. Hence the necessity 
of another language with which to speak of the image. It gets worse, as what is required is not 
only another vocabulary, but also another ethical framework with which to conceive of the 
image as political force. The ethics of traditional photography is inseparable from the 
assumption of correspondence between the image and some form of reality of which it is said 
to be an imprint, but in an environment in which correspondence is replaced with predictive 
algorithms and computation it is unclear what, if any, is the ethical stance of the image. 
The demand for a language that allows speaking about images without excessive 
reliance on such categories as form–matter and subject–object is of course not new. In the 
context of visual culture one could trace its genealogy at least to the work of Walter Benjamin, 
who throughout his life meticulously opposed all forms of idealist aesthetics. Given 
Benjamin’s place in photography theory it is perhaps not surprising that his work helps to 
articulate some of the issues raised by the algorithmic turn in photography, however it is not 
his writings on photography that help to come to terms with the liminal space of the 
networked and the algorithmic image. Specifically, it is not to The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction essay that we turn to – despite this being one of the most often 
reproduced texts in photographic literature – because it offers a rather crude opposition 
between technology and aura.1 Instead, we turn to his sprawling investigation into the crisis 
of experience brought about by the proliferation of technology and the technology of 
proliferation in The Arcades Project. For Benjamin of The Arcades, the most astounding 
aspect of modernity is in the way it both demolishes the recent past and recovers forms of 
Daniel	Rubinstein	 Value	of	Nothing	 Nov	2015	Do	not	quote	without	permission	
5	
pre-rational and pre-historic knowledge, so that the peculiar dialectic of modern technology 
paradoxically points towards the past as well as towards the future: 
“Corresponding to the form of the new means of production, 
which in the beginning is still ruled by the form of the old 
(Marx), are images in the collective consciousness in which the 
new is permeated with the old. […] what emerges in these [...] 
images is the resolute effort to distance oneself from all that is 
antiquated–which includes, however the recent past. These 
tendencies deflect the imagination […] back upon the primal 
past. In the dream in which each epoch entertains images of its 
successor, the latter appears wedded to elements of primal 
history <Urgeschichte>–that is, to elements of classless society. 
And the experiences of such society–as stored in the 
unconscious of the collective–engender, through interpretation 
with what is new, the utopia that has left its trace in a thousand 
configurations of life, from enduring edifices to passing 
fashions.”  (Benjamin 2002, 4) 
What Benjamin discerned in the shopping arcades of Paris was not only the 
worldwide network of commerce; the global system of exchange that defines, catalogues and 
integrates all parts of the world into something like a living organism made of glass and iron 
and an image of a society posited on the universal contract as the highest law. He also saw 
among the wrought iron and the curved glass how, by compressing the world into a single 
point, this new globalized modernity undermined the foundations of its own metaphysical 
order that was posited on linear chronological time, flat spatiality, rational logic and the 
clearest of distinctions between spirit and matter, Image and reality. As Benjamin observed, 
the age of global networks and synthetic materials suggests a move beyond systems of 
representation into a plastic space that demands not only a new aesthetic regime but also a 
new political ontology. The computer networks of silicon and fibber-optic cables parallel this 
move beyond representation; it is simultaneously a move forward towards universal control 
and global information capitalism and a move backwards, in the direction of the classless, 
non-hierarchical existence in which knowledge is unconscious, sensuous, non-reflexive and 
intuitive. 
3. The undecidable is Real
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 As the visual counterpart of the move beyond representation, the digital image stands 
against the whole of the philosophical tradition of Descartes’ cogito in which the subject 
comprehends the world through representing it to itself as an image.  (Judovitz 1988), 
(Rubinstein and Sluis 2013a 22-40) Might we therefore be better served by drawing on 
another thought, one that rejects the Cartesian and dialectical heritage, one that introduced 
into our philosophy the mistrust of representation – by laying bare its historical foundations – 
and one that demands paying close attention to that which falls outside of visibility, certainty 
and positive knowledge. It is perhaps not surprising that until recently the post-
representational turn in philosophy had little impact on photographic theory, but perhaps now 
we are in a position to better appreciate its purchase on the image. The key landmarks of this 
thought can be found in Benjamin’s The Arcades Project, in Nietzsche’s rejection of coherent 
and stable individual identity and of his suspicion of scientific analysis that appeals to the 
higher powers of reason and morality and in Heidegger’s essays The Question Concerning 
Technology and The Age of the World Picture in which he exposes the origins of 
representation in Western metaphysics. Subsequent developments of this trajectory might also 
include the work of Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari. Despite 
the significant differences in political motivations and philosophical commitments, all the 
above thinkers are concerned with the long term damage caused by attachment to regimes of 
representation and subjectivity. Within this tradition the confrontation with representational 
thought is considered essential as means of recovering those aspects of experience that are 
lost when the logic of identity and rationality rules the day.2 
For Heidegger, for instance, modern technology is nothing technological, it is not a 
tool in the service of progress; rather, it is the way by which subjectivity is constituted 
through the process of creation: 
Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way 
of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm 
for the essence of technology will open itself to us. It is the 
realm of revealing, i.e. of truth.”  (Heidegger 1977, 12)  
How might we explore this difficult Heideggerian thought in relation to the post-
representational image? We have already seen that digitality renders the image as a calculable 
surface, or, to invoke Heidegger again, as a “standing reserve” in which the photograph is 
valued not as a singular object but as a resource to be deployed in endless and variegated 
successive contexts: “Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on 
hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for further ordering”  (Heidegger 
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1977, 17). Heidegger’s insight could be interpreted to suggest that the visible aspect of the 
digital image on the computer screen conceals the immense and unimaginable forces that 
operate behind the surface of the screen: 
The gigantic is rather that through which the quantitative 
becomes a special quality and thus a remarkable kind of 
greatness. Each historical age is not only great in a distinctive 
way in contrast to others; it also has, in each instance, its own 
concept of greatness. But as soon as the gigantic in planning 
and calculating and adjusting and making secure shifts over out 
of the quantitative and becomes a special quality, then what is 
gigantic, and what can seemingly always be calculated 
completely, becomes, precisely through this, incalculable. This 
becoming incalculable remains the invisible shadow that is cast 
around all things everywhere when man has been transformed 
into subjectum and the world into picture.   (Heidegger 1977, 
135) 
As a consequence of this paradigm shift from the visual to the incalculable, 
photography has become something immense, even unimaginable, which calls for a very 
different approach to the image. It is no surprise then that there is a tendency to refer to the 
post-industrial technical apparatus which supports image production in terms of amorphous 
and immaterial ‘clouds’ of information and ‘data shadows’. However, what the bucolic 
idioms of clouds, flows, shadows, streams, farms and cookies are supressing is the profound 
unknowability of the picture. In the context of the digital image, Heidegger’s insight suggests 
that the visible aspect of the digital image on the computer screen conceals the immense and 
unthinkable forces that operate behind the surface. The state of ‘becoming incalculable’ 
speculatively suggests that the digital and networked image is not an image at all, rather it is a 
two dimensional subset of a four-dimensional object that we familiarly call ‘the web’. 
4. The outside of the Image / the image of the outside
As we have seen, In The Age of the World Picture Heidegger characterised the 
modern age as the overwhelming arrival of the gigantic and the incalculable and suggested 
that when things become enormous and immeasurable they also become non-representable. 
As the digital image traverses the network it unfolds within two perimeters that constitute its 
envelope: the internal kernel of its specific origins and the conditions of creation and the 
external boundary that is limited only by the limits of the network.3  Amid the gradual 
expansion of the network beyond the limits of the computer, it is increasingly difficult to say 
where augmented reality ends and ‘real’ life begins. Practices such as wearable computing, 
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life-caching and life-logging continually push this envelope by expanding the external 
boundary of the digital image, bringing forth new opportunities for classification, new 
assemblages, new aggregations. The three-point perspectival space of the visible image is 
augmented by various additional spaces that cannot be accounted for either aesthetically or 
representationally but must be considered phenomenologically as the embodiment of the 
network by the user. The digital-born image is never fixed to a single viewing position, it 
moves between spaces and it compels the user to move with it: navigating through Google 
Street View for instance requires body movements that parallel the movements of the 
photographer though the physical space of the street.  (Pink 4-13) Within such platforms there 
is no static viewpoint, no distinct separation between spectatorship and authorship, but an 
array of temporary constellations of images that determine the direction that the spectator 
follows. The presentation of images from the underlying database is dependent on the 
sensitivity of the software not only to the search query, associated metadata and specific 
parameters coded into the interface but also to the physical movements executed by the 
spectator. By way of example, the simple process of logging into Flickr or Facebook will 
trigger the retrieval of multiple data streams (photofeeds, status updates contingent to a user, 
time or tag) which are assembled on the fly to form a webpage. For this  reason the 
phenomenological experience of time online is radically different from chronological, or 
linear time. All the history of one’s searches is contained within the present webpage as it 
unfolds: photography here does not perform the function of an indexical connection with the 
past, but of manifest bifurcation of present into multiple streams with their own peaks, 
crevices and barriers.  
This destabilisation of photographic meaning is the direct result of the image being 
detached from its teleological origins. Traditional ontologies of photography maintain an 
identity between the moment of exposure and all subsequent images, copies and prints that 
follow from it. This identity is ensured because the object is being assimilated by the action of 
light, and transformed by the photographic process that negates the object and preserves it at 
the same time (Cassar 201-215). One of the characteristics of the digital age is that all images 
are theoretically linked through communication networks which distribute, process, assemble 
and re-assemble electronic signals that might or might not appear as an image at some point 
of a cycle of packaging and re-processing of data. 4  Therefore, considered from the 
perspective of the network, the post-representational image allows us to conceive of the 
reconfigured relationship between humans and images. A networked image is both 
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instantaneous in the sense that it can move across the Internet close to the speed of light and 
multiple in the sense that it can bifurcate into any number of simultaneous copies. In this 
networked environment repetition, self-replication, immediacy and divergent parallel 
narratives take precedence over signification and representation. These notions of 
instantaneity and simultaneity introduce into our thinking the experience of stepping outside 
of biological and historical time and inhabiting a different temporal and spatial dimension in 
which the image is not a marker of a linear chronology but of something that is much harder 
to define and yet this something appears apt to describe the fundamental experience of a life 
lived both inside the three dimensional physical space and outside of it, both inside the 
computer screen and outside of it. Seen from this perspective, the post-representational image 
emerges as the go-between that weaves together these two worlds; the physical world of 
three-dimensional objects and the augmented world of data.  (Rubinstein and Sluis 2013a 
151-9)
Whilst the image on the computer screen bears some visual resemblance to a 
projection of a three dimensional space onto a two dimensional plane, and for that reason can 
be said to conform to the logic of the Cartesian perspectival space it is altogether different for 
its internal logic is not that of visual correspondence between an original and a copy but of a 
continuous proliferation of imperfect variants, partial topologies and self-referential 
assemblages. The post-representational image can be said to reproduce nothing, to resemble 
nothing and to stand in for nothing, instead it always offers connections with something else: 
with other images, with its own outside, with screens, tablets and phones on which it flickers, 
with human beings. 
 For this reason, it is remarkable that the focus on the visible aspect of the image tends 
to ignore precisely those qualities of the image that are immanent to the network. As the 
following image (Fig. 1) assembled from a Google Image Search demonstrates, Hippolyte 
Bayard’s Self-Portrait as a Drowned Man has a different sense in each one of its iterations. 
Difference, and not identity becomes here the visual manifestation of photography.  
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fig 1. The Bayards (image: Katrina Sluis) 
In the above image, the search algorithm creates a heterotopia of images connected 
not through a hierarchy of original–copy or of degrees of resemblance but through a non-
hegemonic patterning and correlation of search data and corresponding image results 
(“Bayard”, “self-portrait”, “drowned”) which creates differences of intensities.  (Foucault 
2000, 175-185) The dialectic of original–copy becomes subordinate to a differential logic of 
infinite bifurcation; it is no longer meaningful to ask whether one image instance is a better 
reproduction, because the question of resemblance is rendered undecidable by the search 
algorithm’s respond to the query with almost indefinite number of results. Instead, what 
matters is that every version is a springboard towards yet another instance, triggering an 
infinite succession of image-instances that are all suspended in their own irreducible 
difference from each other. Here photography is not so much a vehicle of representation but 
an expression of the possibility of variation and difference that happens through repetition.5 It 
is significant that in the above image the difference between each version is not ‘analytically 
decomposable’ (Lingis 2000), i.e. it can not be explained by means of a semiotic analysis 
because these images do not have a ‘fixed’ reference point, as within each possible context 
their meaning can be fundamentally altered.6  
Daniel	Rubinstein		 Value	of	Nothing	 Nov	2015	Do	not	quote	without	permission	
11	
Rather than considering this image as thirty five imperfect copies of instances of 
corruption and degradation of the original, the logic of the network allows us to speculate that 
this is an image of post-representational photography glimpsed through the repetition of 
disparate image fragments. Difference her appears not as something visible, but as the 
invisible that is closest to the visible, nurtured and sustained by it.7 It is as if these images are 
framed not by their own borders – which are purely symbolic anyway – rather they are 
enclosed by the differential between them. By evacuating the essentialism of original-copy 
from this (photographic) archive and restoring to it a play of distinctions between degrees of 
intensity, it becomes possible to rethink photography away from the logic of representation. 
This archive of Bayard bursts open the teleological connection between the object and its 
referent, establishing post-representational photography not as the vehicle of identity but as 
the main mechanism by which difference appears within the visual field.  
The difference that arose out of the impurities and distortions of data in this example 
is the result of an interaction between images that does not depend on any underlying 
representation or ‘ground’ in the form of an original, primordial image. It is pointless to ask 
which of these is a true likeness of Bayard’s masterpiece, as this image foregrounds not a new 
form of representation but a kind of texture comprised of noises, differences, distortions and 
contaminations more akin to a-tonal music than to the pre-ordered harmony of a musical 
scale. 8  What is being archived here is not a copy of an original but the possibility of 
bifurcation between copies. In short, we are presented with a sensual kind of logic that 
compels the viewer not to evaluate resemblances but to glimpse the production of difference 
through repetition and self-replication. This multiplicity of repetitions suggests not a 
hierarchy of representations – with some closer to the original than the others – rather, it 
suggests that there are only repetitions without ground and without foundation. As the 
product of algorithmic computation photography is considered here as a process of 
differentiation which creates a visible yet ungraspable image of ourselves as we step out of 
the representational paradigm.9 
5. Conclusion
As photography becomes an encoded, networked object, the emphasis shifts from 
considering it in visual terms towards the semantic processes valorised within computational 
culture. This in turn establishes photography as a kind of unstable surface that produces 
meanings not through indexicality or representation but through the aggregation and the 
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embodiments of data. There is then a need to address the topologies that represent relations 
amongst data, and the way in which the movement of images, their clustering and accretions 
reorganize themselves around the movement of the user as they traverse the interface. 
This paper proposed that the image within the network is doing something other than 
showing us pictures, and it is doubtful if the vocabulary of visual aesthetics and 
representation is fit to tackle this new condition of the image. Because the system of 
representation that has been historically indispensable for photography is increasingly 
inadequate in apprehending the post-representational image, a new set of conceptual tools is 
necessary. What is required is a different ontology of the image, not one of transcendental 
truth, dialectics, light, vision and identity, but an immanent ontology that can engage with the 
undecidable, fragmented, recursive and multiple rhythms produced and sustained by the 
multiplicity of images online. Proliferation and self-replication release the image from its 
stillness, giving it a new meaning as the shape of continuous re-invention, underpinned by 
endless succession of spectators-who-become-authors. The question remains: do we have the 
ears to hear this new, inaudible music emitted by images as they combine and recombine on 
their invisible journeys through the network.  
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Notes ________________________________	
1 One of the most damning criticisms of the Work of Art essay comes from Theodor Adorno: 
‘Benjamin’s theory of the artwork in the age of its technical reproduction may have failed to 
do full justice to this [locating the irrational within the rational – DR]. The simple antithesis 
between the auratic and the mass-reproduced work, which for the sake of simplicity neglected 
the dialectic of the two types, became the booty of the view of art that takes photography as 
its model and is not less barbaric than the view of the artist as creator.’  (Adorno 1997, 72) It 
is however worthy of note that Benjamin authored a second version of the same article, 
translated to English as The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, in 
which some inroads are laid for recovering the auratic within the technological.  (Benjamin 
2008) 
2 The logic of identity finds its fullest expression in Hegel’s dictum: “What is rational is real”. 
(Hegel 1996, xix). In The Thing Heidegger raises the question of nothing (non-being) in order 
.	.	.	
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to extract it from the dialectical formula set up by Hegel: ‘Death is the shrine of nothing, 
namely of that which in all respects is never some mere being, but nonetheless essences, 
namely as being itself. Death, as the shrine of nothing, harbours in itself what essences of 
being. As the shrine of the nothing, death is the refuge of being.’ (Heidegger  2012, 17) In 
treating being and nothing not as dialectically opposed entities but as the ‘belonging together’ 
of being and nothing Heidegger overcomes Hegel’s key dictum that ‘what is rational is real’ 
and opens a path for considering the limitations imposed by dialectical reasoning. 
3 Or as Deleuze puts it: “The crystal-image has these two aspects: internal limit of all the 
relative circuits, but also outer-most, variable envelope, at the edges of the world, beyond 
even moments of the world.” (Deleuze 1989, 80-81)  
4 “The recent rise to prominence of technologies of digitalization has offered possibilities of 
understanding the image beyond this premise of ocularcentrism, for digital images emphasize 
the extent to which the indexicality of photographic or cinematic images–the sense of an 
ontological link between representation and the “real” objects or actions that it represents–can 
be produced through manipulation of algorithms.”  (Khalip and Mitchell 2011, 2)  
5 The notion of difference is a staple of post-metaphysical thought. For Heidegger difference 
is that which lies so near to us that we never notice it, and yet it is difference that allows for 
identity (and for representation) to happen. His conception of difference is most clearly 
articulated in the lecture The Onto-Theo-logical constitution of Metaphysics. See also 
Deleuze’s monumental critique of representation in Difference and Repetition. For an 
overview of the problem of difference see  (Widder 2002)  
6 Deleuze clarifies this point succinctly: “The diversity of narrations cannot be explained by 
the avatars of the signifier, by the states of a linguistic structure which is assumed to underlie 
images in general.”  (Deleuze 1989, 137) 
7 This understanding of difference as the pre-condition of identity is drawing on Deleuze:  
“Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is 
given, that by which the given is given as diverse. Difference is not phenomenon but the 
noumenon closest to the phenomenon”.  (Deleuze 2004, 280) 
8 Alphonso Lingis wrote at length on the noise in the message and on the message of the 
noise: ‘Is it not also false to suppose that only the meaning attached to words by a code, fixed 
or evolving, communicates? The rhythm, the tone, the periodicity, the stammerings and the 
silences communicate.[…] This noise is not analytically decomposable, as communication 
theory would have it, into a multiplicity of signals, information-bits, that are irrelevant or that 
conflict […]. (Lingis 105) Specifically on noise as the aesthetic determination of networked, 
non-Euclidian environments see  (Nechvatal, 2011 and 2009)  
9 For Foucault this kind of archive is never closed, never completed, never achieving the 
totalizing and universal state of ‘truth’, and yet it is productive of a form of existence that 
reclaims difference from representation, a surface out of depth and singularity out of 
homogeneity: “[I]t dissipates that temporal identity in which we are pleased to look at 
ourselves when we wish to exorcise the discontinuities of history: it breaks the thread of 
transcendental teleologies; and where anthropological thought once questioned man’s being 
or subjectivity, it now bursts open the other, and the outside.”  (Foucault 1989, 131) 
.	.	.	
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